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The Computational Impact of
Partial Votes on Strategic Voting
Nina Narodytska 1 and Toby Walsh 2
Abstract. In many real world elections, agents are not required
to rank all candidates. We study three of the most common meth-
ods used to modify voting rules to deal with such partial votes.
These methods modify scoring rules (like the Borda count), elimi-
nation style rules (like single transferable vote) and rules based on
the tournament graph (like Copeland) respectively. We argue that
with an elimination style voting rule like single transferable vote,
partial voting does not change the situations where strategic voting is
possible. However, with scoring rules and rules based on the tourna-
ment graph, partial voting can increase the situations where strategic
voting is possible. As a consequence, the computational complexity
of computing a strategic vote can change. For example, with Borda
count, the complexity of computing a strategic vote can decrease or
stay the same depending on how we score partial votes.
1 INTRODUCTION
Voting is a simple but general mechanism to aggregate the prefer-
ences of multiple agents. Much work in social choice supposes voters
declare a complete ordering over all candidates. In practice, however,
voting systems often permit voters to declare an ordering over a sub-
set of the candidates. For example, in single transferable vote elec-
tions for the Maltese parliament, for the Legislative Assembly of the
Australian Capital Territory, and for the President of Ireland, voters
rank as many or as few candidates as they wish. When all candidates
in a partial vote have been eliminated, this vote is ignored. As a sec-
ond example, in elections for the Free Software Foundation Europe,
voters can again rank as many or as few candidates as they wish. Un-
ranked candidates are considered as equal last when constructing the
tournament graph used to compute the Schulze winner. As a third ex-
ample, the Irish Green Party uses the modified Borda count to elect
its chair. Voters can again rank as many or as few candidates as they
wish. If a voter ranks just k candidates, then their ith choice is given
k − i+ 1 points. The candidate with the most total points wins.
Partial voting can have a significant effect on elections [1]. For ex-
ample, one reason given for the French Academy to drop the Borda
count was “voters had found how to manipulate the Borda rule . . . by
truncating their lists” (page 40 of [2]). As a second example, in elec-
tions for the Tasmanian Parliament, voters are forced to rank a mini-
mum number of candidates to prevent certain types of strategic vot-
ing (for example, when three candidates are running, voters must
1 University of Toronto, Canada, and UNSW, Sydney, Australia, email: ni-
nan@cs.toronto.edu
2 NICTA and UNSW, Sydney, Australia, email: toby.walsh@nicta.com.au.
NICTA is funded by the Australian Government as represented by the De-
partment of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy and
the Australian Research Council. The author is also supported by AOARD
Grant FA2386-12-1-4056.
rank at least two candidates, whilst when four or more candidates are
running, at least three candidates must be ranked).
In this paper, we show that partial voting has a significant impact
on computational issues surrounding strategic voting. Partial voting
has a similar but not completely identical impact on related prob-
lems like computing possible and necessary winners, and campaign
management with truncated ballots [3]. For example, manipulating
with partial votes is different to the possible winners problem with
top truncated ballots [3] since manipulating votes must be complete
in the latter problem. On the other hand, manipulating with partial
votes is equivalent to the extension bribery problem with zero-costs.
One important lesson from this research is that it would be worth-
while to re-visit much previous work in computational social choice
which assumes complete votes [4, 5].
2 BACKGROUND
A complete vote is a linear order over the m candidates. We con-
sider partial votes that are a linear order over a strict subset of the m
candidates (sometimes called “top truncated” votes). An interesting
extension of this work would be to other forms of partial vote (e.g.
when voters only order a subset of the candidate pairs). A voting rule
is a function that maps a tuple of votes to the unique winning alterna-
tive. We consider several common voting rules defined on complete
votes:
Scoring rules: (s1, . . . , sm) is a vector of scores, the ith candidate
in a total order scores si, and the winner is the candidate with
highest total score. The plurality rule has the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0),
whilst the Borda count has the vector (m− 1, m− 2, . . . , 0).
Single transferable vote (STV): This proceeds in rounds. Unless
one candidate has a majority of first place votes, we eliminate the
candidate with the least number of first place votes. Ballots with
the eliminated candidate in first place are re-assigned to the second
place candidate. We then repeat until a candidate has a majority.
Copeland: The candidate with the highest Copeland score wins.
The Copeland score of candidate i is
∑
i6=j(N(i, j) >
n
2
) −
(N(i, j) < n
2
) where N(i, j) is the number of voters preferring
i to j and n is the number of voters. The Copeland winner is the
candidate that wins the most pairwise elections. Formally this is
Copeland0.5 but for brevity, we simply write Copeland.
We discuss in the next section how these rules can be modified to
work with partial votes. All these rules can be easily modified to
work with weighted votes. A vote of integer weight w can be viewed
as w agents who vote identically. To ensure the winner is unique, we
will sometimes need to break ties. A typical assumption made in the
literature (and in this paper) is that ties are broken in favour of the
manipulator. In real world elections, ties are often broken at random
(e.g. by tossing a coin or choosing a random vote). In this case, our
results can be seen as deciding if we can give our preferred candidate
a non-zero chance of winning.
We will consider one agent or a coalition of agents trying to ma-
nipulate the result of the election. Manipulation is where these agents
vote differently to their true preferences in order to change the out-
come whilst the other voters vote truthfully. As in earlier work (e.g.
[6, 7]), we consider two cases where computational complexity may
provide a shield against manipulation: unweighted votes, a small
number of manipulators and an unbounded number of candidates;
or weighted votes, a small number of candidates and a coalition of
manipulators of unbounded size. We assume that the manipulators
have complete knowledge of the other votes. Even though this can
be unrealistic in practice, there are several reasons why this case is
interesting. First, any computational hardness results for complete
information directly imply hardness when there is uncertainty in the
votes. Second, results about the hardness of manipulation by a coali-
tion with weighted votes and complete information imply hardness
of manipulation by an individual agent with unweighted votes and in-
complete information [7]. Third, by assuming complete information,
we factor out any complexity coming from the uncertainty model and
focus instead on computing just the manipulation.
3 PARTIAL VOTES
In practice, voters appear to take advantage of partial voting. As we
already noted, it was observed that members of French Academy cast
truncated votes in an attempt to manipulate the Borda count. As a
second example, in the 1992 General Election for Dublin North, 12
candidates ran, but the 43941 voters ranked only a median of 4 can-
didates, and a mean of 4.98 candidates, with a standard deviation
of 2.88 candidates. In fact, only 8.3% of voters cast a complete vote.
Similarly, in the 1992 General Election for Dublin West, 9 candidates
ran, but the 29988 voters again ranked only a median of 4 candidates,
and a mean of 4.42 candidates, with a standard deviation of 2.33 can-
didates. In this case, 12.7% of the voters cast a complete vote.
We consider a partial vote that ranks just k out of them candidates.
There are a number of different ways that voting rules can be modi-
fied to deal with partial votes. We consider three voting rules (Borda
count, STV and Copeland) which illustrate the most common ways
to treat partial votes. These rules allow us to cover the spectrum of
possible impacts that partial voting has on manipulation. With scor-
ing rules like the Borda count, we can adjust the scoring vector to
deal with a partial vote (e.g. by shifting it down as in the modified
Borda count). With elimination style rules like STV, we can simply
ignore votes once all their candidates are eliminated. Finally, with
rules based on the tournament graph like Copeland, we can simply
treat unranked candidates in a partial vote as tied in last place. We
will look at each method for dealing with partial votes in turn.
4 SCORING RULES
The first method we study to deal with a partial vote is to shift the
scoring vector and score unranked candidates appropriately. Three
possible schemes can be found in the literature for dealing with when
voters rank just k out of the m candidates (k < m):
Round up: A candidate ranked in ith place (i ≤ k) gets a score of
si, unranked candidates get a score of 0. For example, a partial
vote that only ranks a single candidate gives that candidate a score
of s1, and 0 to every other candidate. We denote this Borda↑.
Round down: A candidate ranked in ith place (i ≤ k) gets a
score of sm−(k−i)−1, whilst unranked candidates get a score of
sm. The modified Borda count is an instance of such rounding
down. For example, with the modified Borda count, a partial vote
that only ranks a single candidate gives that candidate a score of
sm−(1−1)−1 = sm−1 = 1, and 0 to every other candidate. As
a second example, a partial vote that ranks two candidates, gives
the first ranked candidate a score of sm−(2−1)−1 = sm−2 = 2,
a score of sm−(2−2)−1 = sm−1 = 1 to the second ranked can-
didate and 0 to every one else. If k = m we use Borda count to
compute scores.
Average score: A candidate ranked in ith place (i ≤ k) gets a score
of si, and unranked candidates get
∑
m≥j>k sj
(m−k)
, the average re-
maining score. For example, a partial vote that only ranks one out
of four possible candidates gives that candidate a score of s1, and
s2+s3+s4
3
, the average of the remaining scores to the other three
candidates. We denote this Bordaav .
We will show that which of these three schemes we choose to deal
with partial votes can have a strong impact on the computational
complexity of computing a manipulation.
4.1 Borda and unweighted votes
Partial voting increases the situations where an election using the
Borda count can be manipulated. For example, suppose we have three
candidates (a, b and p) and a manipulator who wants p to win. One
vote has been cast for each of a > b > p and b > a > p. With
complete votes, a manipulator cannot make p win. The manipulator
must cast a vote that gives at least one point to a or b thereby de-
feating p. However, with Borda↑, the manipulator can cast a vote for
just p who wins by tie-breaking. Partial voting can also change the
computational complexity of computing a manipulation. With com-
plete votes, computing if two voters can manipulate the Borda count
is NP-hard [8, 9]. On the other hand, with partial voting and rounding
up, computing such a manipulation takes polynomial time.
Proposition 1 Computing if a coalition of manipulators can manip-
ulate Borda↑ with unweighted and partial votes takes polynomial
time.
Proof: The manipulators simply vote for the candidate who they
wish to win and no one else. This is the best possible vote. 
If we treat partial votes by rounding down or averaging the re-
maining scores, computing a manipulation remains intractable.
Proposition 2 Computing if two voters can manipulate the modified
Borda count or Bordaav with unweighted and partial votes is NP-
hard.
Proof: We use the same reduction as in [8]. To ensure that the pre-
ferred (first) candidate with an initial score of C wins and that the
n + 2th (of n + 3) candidate with an initial score of 2(n + 2) + C
does not, the two manipulators must cast a complete vote for all n+3
candidates with their preferred candidate in the first place, and the
n + 2th candidate in the last place for Bordaav . If we use the mod-
ified Borda count, manipulators can also cast partial votes of length
n+2 with their preferred candidate in the first place and the n+2th
candidate not ranked. This also achieves the manipulators’ goal of
reducing the gap between the preferred candidate and the n + 2th
candidate to 0. Hence, partial voting does not increase the ability of
the manipulators to manipulate the problem instances used in the re-
duction. 
4.2 Borda and weighted votes
We now turn to weighted votes. With complete votes, computing a
coalition manipulation of the Borda count with just 3 candidates is
NP-hard [7]. With partial votes and rounding up, computing such a
manipulation now takes polynomial time.
Proposition 3 Computing a coalition manipulation of Borda↑ with
weighted and partial votes takes polynomial time.
Proof: The coalition simply votes for their most preferred candidate
and no one else. 
On the other hand, if we treat partial votes by rounding down or
averaging the remaining scores, computing a coalition manipulation
remains computationally intractable.
Proposition 4 Computing a coalition manipulation of the modified
Borda count with weighted and partial votes and 3 candidates is NP-
hard.
Proof: Reduction from the number partitioning problem. We have
a bag of integers, ki summing to 2K and wish to decide if we can
divide them into two partitions, each with sum K. We consider an
election over three candidates, a, b and p in which the manipulating
coalition wish p to win. We have partial votes of weight 3K for a
and for b. Hence, the score of a is 3K and the score of b is 3K.
The voters in the coalition each have weight ki. We identify voters
in the coalition by the corresponding integer ki. Suppose a partition
exists. Let those manipulators in one partition vote p > a > b and
the others vote p > b > a. Now, a, b and p all have scores of 4K so p
wins by tie breaking. Conversely, suppose pwins. We can suppose no
manipulator votes for just a or just b (as this is counter-productive).
Suppose the manipulators have votes of weight x for p > a > b,
y for p > b > a and z for just p. Aside: a vote for p > a is the
same as one for p > a > b as only p gets two points and a gets one
point in these votes, similarly a vote for p > b is the same as one for
p > b > a. Now x+ y + z = 2K. Since p wins, p beats a. That is,
2(x+ y) + z ≥ 3K + x. This simplifies to (x+ y + z) + y ≥ 3K.
Substituting x + y + z = 2K gives y ≥ K. Similarly, p beats b.
That is 2(x + y) + z ≥ 3K + y. Again this gives x ≥ K. But
z = 2K − x− y. Hence, z ≤ 0. Thus, x = y = K and z = 0. That
is, we have a perfect partition. Note that the proof in [10] showing
that coalition manipulation of the Borda count with weighted and
complete votes is NP-hard does not work for the modified Borda
count. In this reduction, the final scores (of 24K and 24K − 3) are
not close enough to preclude a manipulation using both complete and
partial votes even when there is no perfect partition. 
For Bordaav , computing a coalition manipulation with partial
votes is also NP-hard. We have a relatively simple proof for 4 candi-
dates based on a reduction from number partitioning similar to that
for the modified Borda count. For 3 candidates, our proof is much
more complex and requires reduction from a very specialized subset
sum problem which we prove is itself NP-hard.
Proposition 5 Computing a coalition manipulation of Bordaav with
weighted and partial votes and 3 candidates is NP-hard.
Proof: The proof uses a reduction from a specialized subset sum
problem with repetition. Given a bag of positive integers S, such that
S can be partitioned into pairs of identical numbers, and a target sum
t, we consider deciding if there is a subset S′ of S whose sum is t. To
show that this subset sum problem is NP-hard, we modify the reduc-
tion of 3SAT to subset sum in [20]. Consider a CNF formula with n
variables and m clauses. For each literal xi and x¯i we introduce two
equal numbers, yi, y′i, yi = y′i, and zi, z′i, zi = z′i, i = 1, . . . , n,
respectively. For each clause Cj we introduce two equal numbers,
gj and g′j , j = 1, . . . , m. By construction, it follows that numbers
in S can be partitioned into pairs of identical numbers. Each num-
ber yi, y′i, zi, z′i, gj and g′j is a decimal number with n + m digits.
We call the first n digits variable-digits and the last m digits clause-
digits. Consider the yi number, i = 1, . . . , n. The ith digit in yi is
one. If Cj contains xi then the (n + j)th digit is 1. The remaining
digits are zeros. The y′i number is identical to yi, i = 1, . . . , n. Sim-
ilarly, we define numbers zi(z′i), i = 1, . . . , n. The ith digit in zi
is one. If Cj contains x¯i then the (n + j)th digit is 1. The remain-
ing digits are zeros. Consider numbers gj(g′j), i = 1, . . . ,m. The
(n+ j)th digit is 1. The remaining digits are zeros. Finally, we intro-
duce the target number t. The first n digits equal one and the last m
digits equal 3.
Assignment encoding. As first n variable-digits of t are ones, only
one of the numbers yi, y′i, zi, z′i can be selected to S′. Hence, selec-
tion of yi or y′i to S′ encodes that xi = 1, and a selection of zi or z′i
to S′ encodes that xi = 0.
Checking an assignment. Last m clause-digits of t equal 3.
Consider a clause Cj = (xi, x¯s, xk). If none of the variables
yi, y
′
i, zs, z
′
s, yk and y′k is selected to the set S′ then the maximum
value in the (n + j)th digit is two. Hence, one of these variables
must be selected. The reverse direction is trivial. Hence, this subset
sum problem with repetition is NP-hard.
We use this problem to show NP-hardness of coalition manipu-
lation of Bordaav with 3 candidates. Given a set of positive inte-
gers S = {s1, s′1 . . . , s′n, sn}, such that all elements of S can be
partitioned into pairs of identical numbers, {si, s′i}, i = 1, . . . , n,
and a target sum t1, we consider if there is a subset of S, S′,
whose sum is t1. We assume that t =
∑
si∈S
(si + s
′
i). We denote
t2 = t − t1. We have an election over three candidates (a, b and
p) in which the manipulating coalition wish p to win. We have one
complete vote of weight t1 for a > b > p and one complete vote of
weight t2 b > a > p. The total scores from non-manipulators are
score(a) = 2t1 + t2 = t1 + t, score(b) = 2t2 + t1 = t2 + t and
score(p) = 0. The voters in the coalition each have weight (si+s′i).
Suppose a subset sum S′ exists. Consider three cases. If si and s′i are
in S′ then the ith manipulator votes p > b > a. If si and s′i are
not in S′ then the ith manipulator votes p > a > b. If si is in and
s′i is not in S′ then the ith manipulator votes p. Hence, a and b get
si = s
′
i points each. The case when si is not in and s′i is in S′ is
similar. As S′ exists, the score of b from manipulators is exactly the
sum of numbers in S′ which is equal to t1. The preferred candidate
p gets 2t points which is the sum of all elements in S multiplied
by 2. Finally, a gets t2 points which is the sum of all elements in
S \ S′. Hence, the total scores are score(a) = t1 + t + t2 = 2t,
score(b) = t2 + t + t1 = 2t and score(p) = 2t. The preferred
candidate p wins by the tie-breaking rule.
Conversely, suppose p wins. We show that p wins iff p is ranked
first in all manipulators votes. Suppose p’s score is 2t− ǫ, ǫ > 0, so
that it is not ranked first in all manipulator votes. Hence, a and b have
to share t+ ǫ points between them as we have 3t points to distribute.
Let a get q1 and b get q2 points out of t+ ǫ points, q1 + q2 = t+ ǫ.
For p to be a co-winner the following must hold: t+ t1+q1 ≤ 2t−ǫ
and t + t2 + q2 ≤ 2t − ǫ. If we sum up these two inequalities we
get 2t + (t1 + t2) + (q1 + q2) = 4t − ǫ ≤ 4t − 2ǫ. This leads to
a contradiction. Therefore, p is ranked first in all manipulators votes.
In this case, there are exactly t points that the manipulators have to
distribute between a and b. Let a get q1 and b get q2 points out of
t points, q1 + q2 = t. We also know that t + t1 + q1 ≤ 2t and
t + t2 + q2 ≤ 2t. Hence, q1 ≤ t − t1 = t2 and q2 ≤ t − t2 = t1.
As q1 + q2 = t, q1 = t2 and q2 = t1. In a successful manipulation
there are three types of votes: p > a > b, p > b > a and p. If the
ith manipulator votes p > b > a then b gets si + s′i points and we
say that si and s′i belong to S′. If the ith manipulator votes p then b
gets si points and we say that si belongs to S′. If the ith manipulator
votes p > a > b then b gets 0 points. As b1 gets exactly t1 then the
sum of the numbers in S′ is exactly t1. 
For other scoring rules besides the Borda count, it appears likely
that similar results can be given for the impact of partial voting on
weighted and unweighted manipulation.
5 SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE
We now consider the second type of method for dealing with partial
votes. For elimination style rules like STV, a method analogous to
rounding up for scoring rules is used in many real world settings. We
simply ignore a partial vote once all the candidates in the vote have
been eliminated. Unlike with the Borda count, partial voting in STV
elections does not permit more manipulations to take place.
Proposition 6 Under STV, if a coalition of agents can cast partial
votes to ensure a given candidate wins then they can also cast com-
plete votes for the same outcome.
Proof: Suppose the agents can cast partial votes to ensure a given
candidate pwins. We can complete each of their votes without chang-
ing the outcome of the election. We simply add p to the end of the
partial vote (if it does not already include p). Then we add the re-
maining candidates in any order. Such a completion does not change
the result. If the partial vote included p, then the completion will
never be considered. If the partial vote didn’t include p, then we have
merely added another vote for p from the point that all the candidates
in the partial vote have been eliminated. This only helps p to win. 
Since partial voting does not change which elections can be ma-
nipulated, it follows immediately that the computational complexity
of computing a manipulation of STV remains unchanged when we
permit partial voting. In particular, with weighted votes, computing a
coalition manipulation of STV with 3 candidates and complete votes
is NP-hard [7]. The problem remains computationally intractable
when the manipulating coalition can cast partial votes. Similarly,
with unweighted votes, it is NP-hard for a single agent to compute a
strategic manipulating vote of STV [6]. The problem again remains
computationally intractable with partial voting. It would be interest-
ing to identify other voting rules where partial voting has no impact
on manipulation. Not all elimination style rules are unchanged by
partial voting. For instance, it is easy to see that Borda style elimina-
tion rules like Nanson and Baldwin are impacted by partial voting.
6 TOURNAMENT GRAPH RULES
We now consider the third method for dealing with partial votes. For
voting rules based on the tournament graph like Copeland, a method
for dealing with partial votes analogous to rounding up for scoring
rules is used in several real world settings. More particularly, we con-
sider unranked candidates to be tied in last place. Such partial voting
increases the situations where manipulation is possible. Suppose we
have 4 candidates: a, b, c and p. One vote each has been cast for
a > b > c > p, b > c > a > p, and p > c > a > b. We
have one manipulator who wants p to win. If the manipulator casts
a partial vote that just ranks p in first place then every candidate has
a Copeland score of 0, and p wins by tie breaking. Hence, there is a
successful manipulation with partial voting. On the other hand, sup-
pose the manipulator must cast a complete vote. Now a, b and c are
symmetric. They each tie with p (supposing p is ranked in first place
by the manipulator), and in the fixed votes, each beats one candidate
and is beaten by one other candidate. Without loss of generality, we
can suppose therefore that the manipulator casts the complete vote
p > a > b > c. In this case, a wins with a Copeland score of 1.
Hence, with complete voting, manipulation is not possible.
6.1 Copeland and unweighted votes
With complete votes, a simple greedy method will compute a strate-
gic vote for a single agent to manipulate the result of Copeland’s
method in polynomial time when this is possible [11]. We can adapt
this method to construct a strategic partial vote. Our adaptation adds
an additional stopping condition which exits the procedure early with
a successful partial vote. We suppose, as before, that we break ties in
favour of the manipulator. It is, however, easy to relax this assump-
tion. The initial step of the greedy manipulation procedure is to rank
the preferred candidate p in first place. We then repeat the following
steps. If the Copeland score of p is greater than or equal to the cur-
rent Copeland scores of all the other candidates, we stop as we have
a (possibly partial) vote with the desired outcome. Alternatively, we
still need to reduce the Copeland scores of one or more “dangerous”
candidates by voting for a “harmless” candidate. To do this, we de-
termine if there is a candidate who can be placed in the next position
in the partial vote without giving this candidate a Copeland score ex-
ceeding that of p. We add this candidate to the partial vote and repeat.
If there is no such candidate, then we terminate as p cannot win.
Proposition 7 For Copeland’s method, there is a greedy manipula-
tion procedure which finds a strategic partial vote in polynomial time
that makes a given candidate win whenever this is possible.
Proof: Suppose the procedure fails but there exists a partial vote
Π that makes the given candidate p win. Consider the highest can-
didate c not appearing in the partial vote constructed by the greedy
manipulation procedure before it failed. If we add c to this partially
constructed vote then c has a lower Copeland score than if we added
the vote Π. Hence, there was a candidate who could be harmlessly
placed in the next position in the vote. The greedy manipulation pro-
cedure should not therefore have terminated unsuccessfully. 
6.2 Copeland and weighted votes
With complete votes, it is NP-hard to compute a weighted coalition
manipulation of Copeland’s method. As we argued earlier, partial
voting increases our ability to manipulate such elections. However, it
remains computationally intractable to compute such a manipulation.
Proposition 8 Computing a coalition manipulation of Copeland’s
method with weighted and partial votes and 4 candidates is NP-hard.
Proof: Reduction from number partitioning. We are given a bag of
integers ki with sum 2K and wish to determine if there is a partition
into two bags each of sum K. There are 4 candidates, a, b, c and
p where p is the candidate that the manipulating coalition prefers to
win. We suppose there are K fixed identical votes for a > b > c > p
and K for a > c > b > p. The manipulating coalition has a voter of
weight ki for each integer in the bag being partitioned. Suppose there
is a perfect partition, and the voters corresponding to one partition
vote p > b > c > a and in the other vote p > c > b > a.
Then all candidates have a Copeland score of 0, and p wins by the
tie-breaking rule. On the other hand, suppose that the manipulating
coalition can vote so that p wins. Without loss of generality, we can
suppose that they all rank p first. This is the best possible outcome for
p, giving p a Copeland score of 0. The manipulating coalition cannot
therefore cast votes that result in a, b or c having a Copeland score
greater than 0. Now, without the votes of the manipulating coalition,
a has a Copeland score of 3. The manipulating coalition must all
prefer b and c to a to reduce this score. Hence every member of the
manipulating coalition must rank b and c. Finally, b and c are tied
before the manipulating coalition votes. If b is preferred to c overall
then b has a Copeland score of 1. Similarly, if c is preferred to b
overall then c has a Copeland score of 1. Hence, b and c must tie. This
is only possible if the manipulating coalition cast votes of weight
K for b > c and of weight K for c > a. Thus, the manipulating
coalition must cast complete votes of weight K for p > b > c > a
and of weight K for p > c > b > a. 
Note that we cannot use the reduction used in proving the NP-
hardness of coalition manipulation of Copeland’s method with com-
plete votes and 4 candidates [7]. By casting a partial vote for just p
and leaving all other candidates unranked, the manipulating coalition
can make the preferred candidate p win in this reduction even if there
is not a perfect partition. This proof also requires that we break ties
against the manipulating coalition whilst our proof makes the (more
common?) assumption that we break ties in favor of the manipulat-
ing coalition. With just 3 candidates and tie breaking in favour of
the manipulators, coalition manipulation of Copeland’s method with
weighted and complete votes is NP-hard (Theorem 4.1 in [12]). Un-
fortunately, the reduction used in this proof fails for partial votes.
We conjecture that the problem of computing a manipulation of
Copeland’s method is NP-hard with partial votes and 3 candidates.
However, any proof looks as involved as that required for Bordaav .
Our results for Borda, STV and Copeland voting rules with com-
plete and partial votes are summarised in Table 1.
Unweighted CM Weighted CM
Complete votes
Borda NP-hard NP-hard
STV NP-hard NP-hard
Copeland P NP-hard
Partial votes
Borda↑ P P
Modified Borda NP-hard NP-hard
Bordaav NP-hard NP-hard
STV NP-hard NP-hard
Copeland P NP-hard
Table 1: Summary of results.
7 INTRODUCING INTRACTABILITY
We have seen that partial voting has a range of effects on the compu-
tational complexity of computing a manipulation.
1. Partial voting does not change when strategic voting is possible,
and thus there is no change also in the computational cost of com-
puting a strategic vote (e.g. STV).
2. Partial voting permits more strategic voting but there is no change
in the worst case complexity of computing a strategic vote (e.g.
the modified Borda count).
3. Partial voting permits more strategic voting and the worst case
complexity of computing a strategic vote decreases (e.g. Borda↑)
We now demonstrate the fourth and final possibility: partial voting
permits more strategic voting and the worst case complexity of com-
puting a strategic vote increases. This occurs when a strategic but
complete vote takes polynomial time to compute whilst a strategic
but partial vote is NP-hard to compute. In fact, our proof that demon-
strates there exists a subclass of elections where computing a ma-
nipulation with complete votes takes polynomial time (because it is
never possible), but with partial votes and two manipulators it is NP-
hard.
Proposition 9 There exists a variant of Borda voting, and a class of
elections where it takes polynomial time for two agents to compute
their strategic vote when they must cast complete votes but it is NP-
hard with partial votes.
Proof: We consider the scoring rule in which a candidate ranked in
ith position gets a score of m− i+2 where m is the total number of
candidates. Hence the last ranked candidate in a complete vote gets a
score of 2. With partial votes, we suppose scores are rounded down.
That is, if only k candidates are ranked, then the ith ranked candi-
dates gets a score of k − i+ 2, and unranked candidates get a score
of 0. We adapt the reduction used in [8]. We add one “dangerous”
candidates (to give n + 4 candidates in total). This candidate gets
a score from the fixed votes of C + 2(n + 4). All other candidates
get the same score as in the reduction in [8]. Now, if either of the
manipulating agents casts a complete vote, the dangerous candidate
increases their score so is sure to win. In fact, the only way for the
dangerous candidate not to win is for both manipulating agents to
cast a partial vote ranking all but the dangerous candidate. With such
a vote, the dangerous candidate will draw with the other leading scor-
ers. The proof then follows the same argument as in [8]. 
8 PARTIAL VOTING IN PRACTICE
We analysed of the partiality of voting in real world data sets.
We analysed the following data sets from PrefLib [21]: Irish Elec-
tion, Debian Project, Electoral Reform Society (ERS), Glasgow City
Council, F1 and Skiing and Sushi. In many elections, more than half
of the votes contain less than half of the candidates. Therefore, ma-
nipulators have to deal with partial votes. For each set, we picked
several instances and generated 100 elections with t randomly picked
votes from the set of votes in the benchmark, where t ∈ {32, 64}. On
top of this, we vary the length of manipulators’ votes. For each prob-
lem instance, we computed the optimal manipulation with a timeout
of 1000 sec. Table 2 summarizes our results.
We partition instances into two groups. The first group contains
instances with up to 20 candidates. The second group contains in-
stances with more than 54 candidates. Based on the size of the candi-
date list, we varied the length of the manipulators’ votes differently
in these groups. In the first group the lengths of manipulators’ votes
are 3, 6 or 9 and, in the second group, they are 15, 30 or 45. Then
we computed the average time and the average number of manipula-
tors in the optimal manipulation over solved instances with partial or
full votes. It can be seen from the table that there is little correlation
between complexity in practice of finding optimal manipulation with
partial and full votes for Borda↑. On the other hand, for the modi-
fied Borda count, finding an optimal manipulation with full votes is
slightly more expensive. The number of manipulators decreases as
the length of the manipulators’ votes increases for Borda↑. In con-
trast, it stays within a 15% corridor in many benchmarks with the
modified Borda count.
problem name,#id m t Borda↑ Modified Borda count
Manipulators’ votes of length: Full votes Manipulators’ votes of length: Full votes
15 30 45 15 30 45
avg t avg p avg t avg p avg t avg p avg t avg p avg t avg p avg t avg p avg t avg p avg t avg p
F1 and Skiing,#1 54 32 11.8 34.0 7.2 16.7 7.4 11.2 8.1 9.3 6.5 18.3 8.3 18.3 11.1 16.2 15.7 17.5
F1 and Skiing,#1 54 64 26.4 63.6 13.6 31.0 12.8 20.6 14.7 17.2 12.9 34.7 16.4 34.7 17.2 24.9 21.9 26.1
F1 and Skiing,#14 62 32 17.4 39.0 10.1 19.1 9.1 12.8 11.1 9.3 8.1 18.6 10.0 18.6 14.4 18.6 17.7 13.4
F1 and Skiing,#14 62 64 41.6 79.8 20.7 38.8 18.2 25.8 28.5 18.6 16.4 37.6 20.1 37.6 28.5 37.6 26.1 21.7
F1 and Skiing,#17 61 32 15.3 36.2 8.8 17.8 8.5 11.9 10.2 8.8 7.8 18.5 10.0 18.5 14.2 18.5 15.1 11.2
F1 and Skiing,#17 61 64 33.0 65.9 16.7 32.1 15.1 21.4 17.2 15.8 15.1 34.1 19.2 34.1 28.6 33.9 15.9 14.0
Sushi Data,#2 100 32 4.7 5.1 4.4 2.7 4.8 1.9 8.3 1.0 7.6 10.8 10.1 10.8 14.1 10.8 62.1 10.8
Sushi Data,#2 100 64 6.0 8.1 5.3 4.2 5.6 2.9 11.6 1.7 12.4 17.0 16.8 17.0 23.2 17.0 91.3 16.9
Manipulators’ votes of length: Full votes Manipulators’ votes of length: Full votes
3 6 9 3 6 9
avg t avg p avg t avg p avg t avg p avg t avg p avg t avg p avg t avg p avg t avg p avg t avg p
Debian Project Data,#4 8 32 6.6 32.8 4.4 12.7 26.4 6.8 0.8 11.3 39.8 8.8 52.4 8.7
Debian Project Data,#4 8 64 42.2 62.5 5.1 21.8 31.2 10.3 2.4 20.7 21.8 12.7 22.8 10.6
Irish Election Data,#1 9 32 1.7 13.6 0.9 5.7 15.1 3.7 0.9 8.7 0.9 7.6 8.1 7.5
Irish Election Data,#1 9 64 3.5 24.7 1.1 10.2 5.7 6.1 1.1 14.9 1.2 12.0 26.9 11.5
Debian Project Data,#5 9 32 4.6 23.6 1.2 9.8 7.1 5.2 0.7 7.2 1.4 6.1 10.5 5.9
Debian Project Data,#5 9 64 25.8 48.4 2.2 19.5 2.5 7.4 1.1 14.2 12.8 9.3 15.2 9.1
Glasgow City Council,#1 9 32 1.1 8.6 0.7 3.8 0.9 2.6 0.8 7.2 12.4 7.0 11.5 6.6
Glasgow City Council,#1 9 64 1.9 14.4 0.8 6.1 5.7 4.0 1.0 13.1 8.3 11.1 14.4 10.2
ERS Data,#1 10 32 1.8 16.5 0.9 6.9 1.0 4.5 1.0 4.1 1.0 10.7 1.3 10.7 7.2 10.5 7.1 10.5
ERS Data,#1 10 64 3.8 29.3 1.3 12.0 1.1 7.7 1.3 7.0 1.4 18.2 2.5 18.1 17.8 16.8 17.8 16.8
ERS Data,#38 11 32 2.9 24.3 1.2 10.0 1.0 6.4 1.0 5.3 0.9 9.6 1.1 9.6 3.3 9.5 7.0 9.6
ERS Data,#38 11 64 9.0 47.9 1.8 19.4 1.6 12.3 1.6 9.9 1.5 18.2 1.7 18.2 8.8 18.2 3.7 18.2
Irish Election Data,#2 12 32 1.5 16.6 1.0 6.9 1.1 4.5 18.4 3.4 1.1 9.6 1.9 9.5 6.9 7.9 10.2 7.5
Irish Election Data,#2 12 64 2.2 28.7 1.4 11.8 1.2 7.5 1.4 5.0 1.5 17.6 5.7 17.4 8.8 13.4 20.2 12.5
Glasgow City Council,#7 13 32 1.1 9.0 0.9 3.9 0.8 2.6 1.0 1.9 1.1 9.7 1.3 9.7 1.6 9.7 15.8 9.7
Glasgow City Council,#7 13 64 1.6 16.0 1.0 6.7 0.9 4.4 4.6 3.2 1.6 17.0 1.9 17.0 2.6 16.8 20.7 14.6
ERS Data,#4 20 32 2.5 19.5 1.8 8.1 1.6 5.3 1.5 2.5 1.6 9.0 1.8 9.0 2.2 9.0 2.8 9.0
ERS Data,#4 20 64 3.7 34.0 2.3 13.9 2.0 8.8 2.0 4.1 2.1 15.8 2.5 15.8 2.8 15.8 15.6 15.3
Table 2: The average time to find an optimal manipulation (avg t) and the average number of manipulators (avg p). Timeout is 1000 sec.
9 CONCLUSIONS
In many elections, voters can cast partial votes. We have studied three
of the most common methods used to modify voting rules to deal
with such partial votes. These methods modify scoring rules, elim-
ination rules and rules based on the tournament graph respectively.
We argued that partial voting may not change the situations where
strategic voting is possible (e.g. with STV). However, with the Borda
count and Copeland’s method, partial voting increases the situations
where strategic voting is possible. As a consequence, the computa-
tional complexity of computing a manipulation can change. For ex-
ample, with the Borda count, the complexity can decrease or stay the
same depending on how we score partial votes. We were even able
to demonstrate a situation where the computational complexity of
computing a manipulation increases when we permit partial voting.
Our results are worst-case and may not reflect the difficulty of ma-
nipulation in practice. A number of recent theoretical and empiri-
cal results suggest that manipulation can often be computationally
easy on average (e.g. [13] - [19]). Our NP-hardness results should
therefore be seen as just one of the first steps in understanding the
impact of partial voting on the computational complexity of comput-
ing a manipulation. There are many other interesting directions to
follow. For example, do results like these suggest which is the best
way to deal with partial voting? Might we increase our bias for STV
over the Borda count based on its resistance to manipulation by par-
tial voting. As a second example, how does partial voting impact on
computational issues surrounding related problems like possible and
necessary winners, control and bribery?
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